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COMMENTARY
WHAT ELSE MIGHT WE ASK?: COMMENTARY ON FANTINO AND
STOLARZ-FANTINO’S “GAMBLING: SOMETIMES
UNSEEMLY; NOT WHAT IT SEEMS”
Iser G. DeLeon
The Kennedy Krieger Institute and
Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine
____________________

Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino have offered
a highly informative summary of behavior
analytic knowledge regarding problem gambling. As is sometimes the case with this sort
of treatment, its greatest value might lie in
making clear how much we do not know. Below, I follow their lead in discussing how behavior analytic considerations of problem
gambling may be incomplete and suggesting
additional, potentially fruitful, avenues of inquiry.

local and extended temporal scales. Individual
bets are influenced by sunk costs (see below)
and, in the longer run, self-statements such as
―one more big bet can help me re-coup all
those prior losses‖ are also a form of sunkcost effect. The so-called ―gambler’s fallacy‖, a failure to understand or acknowledge
that past failures or successes have no bearing
on the probability of winning the next gamble, is almost certainly related to sunk costs.
Navarro and Fantino (2005) clearly succeeded in pointing towards promising directions for curtailing sunk-cost effects. Still, as
the current authors note, stimuli indicating
risk are already ubiquitous in the gambling
environment. Informational strategies aimed
at curtailing sunk-cost effects may be further
questioned insofar as experienced gamblers
have a keen self-awareness of this form of
irrational behavior. This is perhaps illustrated
by the elaborate vocabulary for such effects
that exists in gambling culture. Poker players,
for example, acknowledge being ―pot committed‖ to a hand—the poker player’s version
of sunk cost. Similarly, being ―on tilt,‖ describes, among other things, an extended period of emotionally infused irrational decision-making. That gamblers can already discern these features of their own behavior
makes one question the benefits of supplemental stimuli that confirm its irrationality.
Informational strategies further fail to acknowledge other, possibly self-defeating, effects that such stimuli may have. A potential-

ON THE RELEVANCE OF SUNK
COSTS AND THE SALIENCE OF
RISK INFORMATION
Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino ask ―How
salient are the contingencies in standard gambling situations?‖ The implication is that
making the prevailing contingencies more
transparent may make behavior more optimal.
This has clearly played out well in the authors’ examinations of cost sunk-effects.
Sunk-cost effects seem particularly relevant
and, I think, cannot be overestimated in the
current context. This particular form of irrational behavior pervades the gambling culture
and influences problem gambling on both
__________
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ly relevant extrapolation from recent research
is that reward-related stimuli, ironically, may
decrease sensitivity to risk information. Ditto, Pizarro, Epstein, Jacobson, and MacDonald (2006) arranged two relative probabilities of winning a pleasant experience (eating
an unlimited number of cookies) versus an
unpleasant task (completing problems for 30
min). The gamble was made by choosing a
card from a deck of 10. For some subjects, 8
cards resulted in cookies and 2 resulted in
work (low-risk scenario); for others, 6 cards
resulted in cookies and 4 resulted in work
(higher-risk scenario). The dependent variable
was simply what proportion of the subjects
accepted the gamble. When the cookies were
simply described to subjects, they showed a
rational sensitivity to risk information: 95%
took the low-risk gamble, but only 45% accepted the high-risk gamble. When visceral
cues were provided (the students could see
and smell the fresh-baked cookies), these differences disappeared: over 80% of students
in both the low- and higher-risk group accepted the gamble. In essence, the students’
behavior was less sensitive to risk information
in the presence of those cues than in the absence of the cues. Furthermore, the visceral
cues altered the perceived likelihood of winning. Students rated their chances of winning
the cookies to be better when the cues were
present than when they were absent.
If we can extrapolate to the current context, stimuli that increase the salience of risk
are themselves visceral (at least visual) cues,
and/or are often embedded in contexts that
provide further related stimulation. Where is
the problem gambler likely to encounter risk
information on betting on a given horse? For
some, the answer is at the race track amidst
the sights, sounds, and yes, smells of horse
racing. This may help to account for Dixon,
Jacobs, and Sanders’ (2006) finding that delayed rewards generally were discounted
more steeply in a gambling environment than
in a non-gambling environment. Context ap-
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pears to matter. Individual predispositions,
however developed, to various forms of context-driven arousal may also be relevant. For
example, sexually aroused college students,
not surprisingly, reported a higher likelihood
of engaging in risky sexual behavior than
when they were not sexually aroused (Ariely
& Lowenstein, 2006).

ON THE RELEVANCE OF SELFCONTROL AND DISCOUNTING
PARADIGMS
Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino later ask,
―What remains incomplete in any account of
gambling based on discounting?‖ Discounting
of delayed rewards is certainly relevant and
essential differences in discounting patterns
between pathological gamblers and others are
informative. Still, I agree with Fantino and
Stolarz-Fantino that accounts based on differences in discounting functions may be incomplete or oversimplified. How might behavioral discounting preparations, whether intertemporal or probabilistic, more fully capture
important features of the real problem space?
One issue is whether sooner-smaller vs.
larger-later choices adequately take into account the actual consequences of poor choices. Larger, delayed outcomes are typically
cast as greater magnitudes along the same qualitative dimension, but aren’t delayed aversive consequences more to the point when
considering ―pathological impulsivity‖? The
suffering produced by the delayed aversive
outcome of risky behavior is qualitatively different from foregoing the delayed potential
gain. For example, lighting a cigarette is
sometimes cast as a choice between immediate benefits of nicotine self-administration
vs. the delayed benefits of a longer, healthier
life. But losing out on a long life is not quite
equivalent to suffering through lung cancer.
Similarly, the delayed gains of larger amounts
of money are very different from dealing with
bankruptcy. Self-control has, on occasion,
been cast in terms of negative consequences
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(e.g., Deluty, 1978), but my point is that the
positive and negative consequence versions
are not necessarily equivalent. As Fantino and
Stolarz-Fantino point out, aversion of risk is
motivationally more potent than the promise
of gain (as exemplified by the 50/50 chance
of winning $200 vs. losing $100 experiment).
In dealing with pathology, might we be closer
to the point in arranging choices between
small, immediate gains vs. large, delayed
aversive consequences?
In relation, typical self-control preparations fail to fully take into account dependencies inherent in real-world choices. Repeated
impulsive choices do not simply displace the
alternative rational options; they lessen the
quality of the delayed consequences. The
more frequently the impulsive choice is repeated, the greater the probability of the delayed aversive outcome. Thus, more frequent
decisions to light up that cigarette actually
decreases the probability of a long, healthy
life and/or increases the likelihood of lung
cancer, heart disease, etc. In dealing with pathology, might we be closer to the point in
arranging choices between small, immediate
gains vs. delayed alternatives that worsen as a
function of impulsive choices?
Yes, many people gamble, but only some
develop pathology. Behavior analysts have
examined different sensitivities between problem gamblers and others as a basis of addressing the problem. Temporal discounting is certainly a good start, as are observations that
gamblers are less sensitive to changes in the
probability of rewards (Holt, Green, and
Myerson’s, 2003). Fantino and StolarzFantino have proposed a variety of potentially
useful avenues for examining further differences: Do problem gamblers evince the same
degree of risk aversion? Are gamblers more
prone to be thinking about gambling? Are
problem gamblers more susceptible to gambling related instructions or advertisement?
My hope is that the above is informative in
stimulating still others: Are problem gam-
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blers relatively less likely to understand that
past failures have no bearing on future odds
or are they simply more driven by other factors to ignore these relations? Are problem
gamblers relatively less likely to attend to risk
information—possibly an observing response
issue? Are problem gamblers more sensitive
to the effects of gambling-related visceral
cues?
Do they become relatively more
aroused by the outcomes, positive or negative,
of their choices? Could there be benefit in
casting self-control experiments in terms of
small, immediate gains vs. delayed aversive
consequences. Are problem gamblers relatively less sensitive to long-term aversive outcomes than casual gamblers or non-gamblers?
Most importantly, from a functional behavior
analytic perspective, what sort of individual
history impacts relative sensitivity to these
variables? Onward.
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